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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff7Appellee,
V.

«

DAVID ROGER MARKLAND,

Case No. 20020965-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, David Markland is challenging the
trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress. (Brief of Appellant, dated February 24,
2003.) The trial court ruled that the deputies in this case were justified in detaining
Markland for a level-two seizure, warrants check, and search based on the fact that
Markland was walking on a dark, dead-end road with two shoulder bags at 3:14 a.m., and
the deputies had received an ambiguous report of someone crying in the area. (R. 7880.) The trial court applied an incorrect standard to the level-two seizure.
Specifically, under the law, a level-two seizure may be justified if the officers
articulate objective facts to support a reasonable suspicion that defendant is engaged in
criminal activity. The trial court here failed to recognize that standard. (See R. 111:17;
78-80.) Its ruling on the motion to suppress cannot be upheld.
In addition, the state has acknowledged that the objective facts reasonably support
innocent conduct. (See State's Brief of Appellee ("State's Brief) at 9, 10.) Nevertheless, the state seems to urge this Court to impose a general criminal gloss to unspecified

"possibilities]" and "suggestions]" to justify the deputies' conduct. (See State's Brief
at 9-10.) That would be improper.
The record in this case fails to justify the detention based on a reasonable
suspicion that Markland was engaged in criminal activity. (See record generally.) The
deputies' conduct in detaining Markland for a warrants check and search was
unconstitutional. Markland respectfully urges this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling
on the motion to suppress. (See Brief of Appellant; also, infra subpoint B., below.)
As a final matter, the state claims that defendant invited the error in this case. That
claim is misplaced. At all times relevant, Markland has maintained that the deputies
lacked reasonable suspicion to support a level-two detention for the warrants check and
search. (See record in general; Brief of Appellant.) The state's procedural argument
should be rejected. See infra, subpoint A., below.
ARGUMENT
THE STATE RELIES ON UNSPECIFIED POSSIBILITIES TO CLAIM
THE DEPUTIES WERE JUSTIFIED IN DETAINING MARKLAND.
A. TO BEGIN. THE STATE'S "INVITED-ERROR" ARGUMENT IS
MISPLACED.
The state begins its legal analysis in this case by citing to the "invited-error"
doctrine. (State's Brief at 5-7.) That doctrine is not applicable here.1 At all times during

1 In connection with its argument concerning invited error, the state has cited to State v.
Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), and State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), and to the dissenting opinion in State v. Samora. 2002 UT App 384, ^[29, 59 P.3d
604. (State's Brief at 6.) Dunn and Perdue compel the determination that the invited2

the proceedings in the lower court, Markland maintained that the deputies were not
justified in detaining him for the warrants check and search. (R. 65-70; 111.)
Specifically, in papers filed with the trial court, Markland argued that pursuant to
the law, when an officer retains possession of a person's identification for purposes of
running a warrants check, that constitutes a level-two detention. Also, an officer is justified in conducting a level-two detention if he has articulated objective facts to support a
reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity. (R. 65-69.)
Markland maintained that in this case, the deputies engaged in a level-two seizure. (R.
68.) Markland also argued that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion to support the
seizure. (R. 68-70.) Markland's filings in the lower court support proper preservation of
the issue on appeal. (See Brief of Appellant (raising reasonable-suspicion issue).)
Next, during a hearing on the motion to suppress, Markland again argued that the
deputies lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Markland for the investigation and
warrants check. (R. 111:13-15, 17.) Defense counsel stated that the question before the

error doctrine is not applicable here. In Dunn, the Utah Supreme Court specified that the
invited-error doctrine "has two principal purposes. First, it fortifies our long-established
policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error."
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220 (cites omitted). And ff[s]econd, it discourages parties from
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on
appeal." Id; Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205 (recognizing that a party may not appeal a jury
instruction that the party requested at trial). Here, Markland specifically and repeatedly
maintained in the trial court that the deputies were not justified in detaining Markland for
a warrants check and investigation. (R. 65-70; 111:14-15.) That argument gave the trial
court sufficient opportunity to address the matter and to grant the motion to suppress
under the proper rule of law. In the lower court, Markland satisfied the principles
relevant to the preservation doctrine.
3

court was whether the deputies were justified in conducting a level-two detention: "In
order to do so, an officer has to have articulable suspicion that this person [defendant]
has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. That raises [the encounter] to the
level of reasonable suspicion. And as I've argued in my memorandum, even if you take
everything that has been stated, the lateness of the hour, the area that he's in, there's just
been a crime in the area, that is not enough for reasonable suspicion for a level two stop."
(R. 111:14: see also 111:17 (citing State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).)2
Thereafter, the trial court stated its basis for denying the motion to suppress as follows:

2 In its brief, the state has emphasized the fact that Markland's trial counsel stated in the
lower court that under a level-one stop, an officer may "stop and question the individual.
The initial questioning is fine" (State's Brief at 6 (emphasis in original).) And trial
counsel asserted that once an officer "takes [the individual's] identification, [the officer
has] detained him and that has risen to a level two stop ." (Id.)
Trial counsel's assertions were statements of law. Under the law, this Court has
recognized that a level-one encounter occurs "when an officer approaches and questions
a suspect. An officer may stop and question a person at any time so long as that person
i s not detained against his [or her] will.'" State v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996) (cite omitted), cert denied. 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). Also, when an officer
takes a person's identification and retains it for a warrants check, that constitutes a leveltwo detention. Salt Lake Citv v. Rav. 2000 UT App 55, W 3 - 1 7 , 998 P.2d 274. The
statements were appropriate. They also were inconsequential.
Even if counsel had made an incomplete statement of the law, that would not be
binding on the court. See i.e., Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Inc.. 2000 UT 14,ffl[34-40& 4445, 1 P.3d 528 (ruling that a court is not bound by the stipulations of counsel concerning
points of law), cert, denied. 531 U.S. 1011 (2000). For relevant statements of the law,
Utah courts look to legislative and judicial pronouncements, not statements of counsel.
Also, counsel here did what was necessary to properly preserve the issue for
review: Counsel maintained that the deputies engaged in a level-two detention without
reasonable suspicion. That is the central issue on appeal.
4

. . . I've made up my mind. I think there's - there are a couple of added factors
that played into what I believe was an appropriate stop by the officer, and that is,
[that defendant was] headed down a dead end road where he can't go anywhere,
can't get anywhere, is suspicious enough in my own mind. And then the fact that
he said he was going home, and his home was nowhere in the area. So you not
only have the three factors that you just mentioned, Ms. Sisneros [citing factors in
State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), th at failed to support
reasonable suspicion, including: (i) late at night, (ii) defendant was in a high crime
area, and (iii) defendant was walking with a knapsack], but those two additional
factors that play heavy on me in terms of my belief that the officer was doing what
he should have done appropriately. I believe he would have been remiss in not
pursuing it further just because the whole circumstance didn't make any sense.
He was there on a call and here's this guy that tells him he's going home? With
no way to go home?
(R. 111:17.)
At that point, Marklandfs counsel again attempted to object to the matter, but was
cutoff by the trial judge. (R. I l l : 17.) Under the circumstances, the issue was properly
preserved. (R. 111:17); see State v. Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332,1J25 n.4, 37 P.3d
260 (where the record showed that defense counsel tried to further object to the trial
court's ruling and was refused, counsel properly preserved the issue for appeal).
This Court may review the issue on the merits. To that end, Markland respectfully
urges this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
B. FOR A LEVEL-TWO DETENTION, THE SPECIFIC AND OBJECTIVE
FACTS MUST SUPPORT A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT ON THE MERITS SEEMS TO DISREGARD THAT STANDARD.
In its merits argument, the state maintains that the deputies here were justified in
conducting a level-two detention with Markland. In support of that position, the state
seems to rely on sweeping generalizations and suggestions that are not supported by the
5

specific facts of record in this case. (See infra, subpoint B. 1., herein.)
In addition, assuming arguendo the deputies here were justified initially in seizing
Markland, once the deputies learned that Markland had no information about the
purported cries, they had no basis under the reasonable-suspicion standard to expand the
detention for a warrants check. The state does not dispute that point. Thus, this Court
may reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress on that basis. (See infra,
subpoint B.2., herein.)
1. While the State Acknowledges the Reasonable-Suspicion Standard, It Urges a
Standard Here that Replaces the Specific Facts and Circumstances with Gross
Generalizations.
The state acknowledges that to justify the detention in this case, the deputies were
required to articulate a reasonable suspicion that Markland was involved in criminal
activity. (See State's Brief at 8-9.) The state asserts the following: "The reasonable
suspicion necessary for an investigative stop . . . must be judged against an objective
standard — that is, whether there were specific and articulable facts known to the officer,
which taken together with rational inferences from these facts, created a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to justify intrusion into the defendant's personal property."
(State's Brief at 8 (citing State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, Tfl2, 988 P.2d 7).) Also,
the state identifies guiding principles relevant to the reasonable-suspicion standard.
First, the state specifies that this Court will judge the officer's conduct in light of
"common sense and ordinary human experience" and it will accord deference to an
officer's ability to distinguish between innocent conduct and criminally suspicious
6

actions. (State's Brief at 8-9 and 10 (citing State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, ^|8, 47
P.3d 932).) That principle is understood to mean that a reviewing court may not reject
facts that the officer has identified as relevant to the matter; the principle supports the
"totality of the circumstances" analysis. The United States Supreme Court has explained
the principle in United States v. Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002).
There, a border patrol agent stopped defendant and his passengers in a remote area
on an unpaved road north of the Arizona-Mexico border. Arvizu. 122 S.Ct. at 747-48.
The agent discovered that defendant was transporting more than 100 pounds of
marijuana in his vehicle. Id. In trial court proceedings, defendant moved to suppress the
evidence on the grounds that the agent lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.
Id. The trial court rejected defendant's argument based on the following evidence.
According to the record, Douglas, Arizona is located on the United States-Mexico
border. Two highways lead north from Douglas: Highway 191 and Highway 80. An
immigration checkpoint is located on Highway 191. Arvizu. 122 S.Ct. at 748. Leslie
Canyon Road also leads north from Douglas. It is unpaved for a distance. It does not
have an immigration checkpoint. Officers use directionally sensitive sensors on that road
to "signal the passage of traffic that would be consistent with smuggling activities." IcL
Drug smugglers use Leslie Canyon Road to circumvent the immigration checkpoints. Id From Leslie Canyon Road, smugglers connect onto Rucker Canyon Road
then Kuykendull Road, which allows them to gain access to Phoenix and Tucson. IcL at
748. The Kuykendull Road in part is primitive and the last possible turnoff to avoid a
7

border checkpoint. Id. at 748.
In January 1998, a border-patrol agent received a report that the Leslie Canyon
Road sensor had triggered at a time when agents would have been involved in a shift
change, leaving the area unpatrolled. Id_ The agent investigated the matter after
receiving a report that another sensor also had triggered, placing the vehicle on Rucker
Canyon Road. Id at 749. The agent's timing was such that when he observed a minivan
on the road, he believed it had triggered the sensors. Also, he had not seen any other
vehicle on the road. Id. at 749.
The agent pulled off the road to observe the minivan drive by. He saw 2 adults
and 3 children in the minivan. The driver appeared rigid, and two of the children in the
back were sitting as if their knees were propped up on cargo on the floor. Id_ As the
agent began to follow the minivan, he saw the children put their hands up at the same
time and wave in an abnormal pattern, off and on for about five minutes. Id_ The
waving was "'methodical,' 'mechanical,' 'abnormal,' and 'certainly . . . a fact that is odd
and would lead a reasonable officer to wonder why they are doing this." Id. at 752.
The agent then observed the driver turn abruptly onto Kuykendull Road. That
was significant because the driver turned "at the last place that would have allowed the
minivan to avoid the checkpoint." Id. at 749. Also, based on the route the minivan was
taking, the agent could not conceive of any place for the occupants to picnic, since they
headed away from picnic areas. The agent "radioed for a registration check and learned
that the minivan was registered to an address in Douglas that was four blocks north of the
8

border in an area notorious for alien and narcotics smuggling." Id. at 749. The agent
determined to stop the vehicle. Id_ During a consensual search, he discovered duffel
bags of marijuana under the feet of the children in the back seat. Id. at 749-50.
After the trial court denied the motion to suppress, Defendant Arvizu challenged
the matter in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit
reversed the trial court's ruling. Id. at 750. In doing so, it rejected many of the facts
identified by the agent on the basis that the facts "carried little or no weight in the
reasonable-suspicion calculus." Id. The court also ruled that the remaining evidence was
insufficient to support the stop. Id at 750. The Supreme Court then reviewed the matter.
It ruled that the Ninth Circuit was not at liberty to reject facts articulated by the
agent. Such an approach served to "seriously undercut the 'totality of the circumstances'
principle which governs the existence vel non of 'reasonable suspicion.'" Id. at 752.
Where the agent had criminal suspicions based on his training and his familiarity with the
specific practices in the area, the Court gave deference to the agent, and then looked to
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was an objective basis for
suspecting criminal activity. It upheld the trial court's ruling. See id. at 752; see also
U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (based on evidence of distinctive footprints in the
desert over a particular route at specified times, officers deduced that a vehicle was
making round trips to transport several aliens late at night during clear weather; officers
set up a surveillance on a clear night based on the investigation, and stopped the only
vehicle that was large enough to transport several people and that made a round trip).
9

In making an assessment in Markland's case, this Court likewise will adhere to the
"totality of the circumstances" analysis. See Beach, 2002 UT App 160, TJ8. It will assess
whether Deputy Spotten identified criminal suspicions based on his experience and
training. In this case, Deputy Spotten did not. (See. record in general (no mention of
criminal suspicions).)
This Court then will assess the total facts and circumstances under an objective
standard to determine whether they support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
justify a level-two detention. See. Beach. 2002 UT App 160, ^8. In this case, the total
facts and circumstances fail to support such a suspicion for the stop. (See R. 78-80,
where the trial court's ruling upholding the detention was not based in reasonable
suspicion that Markland was involved in criminal activity.)
Specifically, according to the facts, on April 30, 2001, Spotten and a second
deputy received a dispatch call at 3:14 a.m. of cries or screams on the east side of the
Bridgeside Landing Complex. (R. 111:3; 78, ^fl.) Spotten testified that the east side of
the complex "goes back" "a ways" past buildings to basketball courts, a bike path and a
dead-end road. (R. I l l :3-4; 78, lfl[2-3.) The basketball courts were opened and accessible on the side of the road. (R. I l l :5.) The bike path was gated and locked. (R. I l l :
5; 78,1J3.) It was dark. (R. 111:8; 78, ^[4.) The deputies did not have a particular suspicion one way or another with respect to the screams or cries. (See. record in general.)
When the deputies arrived in the area, they saw Markland walking in the road

10

toward the dead end. They did not see anyone else. (R. I l l :6; see. 79,1HJ5-7.) Deputy
Spotten asked Markland if he had heard anything in the area. (R. I l l :7.) Markland had
not. (Id; 79, IP-10.)
Markland was carrying two over-the-shoulder cloth bags. (R. I l l :8; 79, ^[6.) The
deputy asked where Markland was going, and he responded home. (R. 79, ^11-12.)
Markland lived in the area of 1300 East and 4500 South. (R. 79,1fl2.) Spotten testified
that he was not nsure exactly how [Markland was] going to get [home] based on the
dead-end road." (R. 111:11; see. 79, ^ 13.) He was not sure because he did not ask. (See
R. I l l , generally.) Instead Spotten requested Markland's identification (111:9), and he
told Markland he needed to run a warrants check. (R. I l l :9; 79, Tfl4.) Deputy Spotten
discovered a warrant and he arrested Markland. (R. 111:10; 79, ^(15.) During the arrest,
the deputy found drugs, giving rise to the charges in this case. (R. 111:10; 79, ^J16.)
The deputies did not claim to have any criminal suspicions concerning Markland.
(See record in general.) In addition, the record fails to support a reasonable suspicion
that Markland was involved in criminal activity. Even with "deference" to the deputies
(see Beach. 2002 UT App 160, Tf8), on this record "common sense and ordinary human
experience" (id,) compel the determination that the trial court ruling was in error. This
Court should reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
Second, the state identifies the following additional principles relevant to the
reasonable-suspicion standard: It claims that while some of the defendant's activities may
be explained as innocent, "'officers need not close their eyes to suspicious circum11

stances/1' (State's Brief at 9 (citing Beach, 2002 UT App 160, Tfl 1); see also State's
Brief at 10, 11.) And it claims where each of a series of acts is "'perhaps innocent in
itself,'" taken together, the acts may warrant further investigation. (State's Brief at 10
(citing Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 751).) Those principles again relate to the "totality of the
circumstances" assessment, as set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
There, Officer McFadden observed Defendant Terry and two friends "go through
a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself," but which taken together supported suspicious criminal activity warranting a level-two detention and investigation.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. The Court described the series of events as follows:
There is nothing unusual in two men standing together on a street corner, perhaps
waiting for someone. Nor is there anything suspicious about people in such
circumstances strolling up and down the street, singly or in pairs. Store windows,
moreover, are made to be looked in. But the story is quite different where, as
here, two men hover about a street corner for an extended period of time, at the
end of which it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or anything;
where these men pace alternately along an identical route, pausing to stare in the
same store window roughly 24 times; where each completion of this route is
followed immediately by a conference between the two men on the corner; where
they are joined in one of these conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly; and
where the two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks
away. It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years1
experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to
have failed to investigate this behavior further.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. Where the total facts and circumstances supported a reasonable
suspicion, the officer was justified in his actions. Id
In Markland's case, assuming arguendo Spotten had criminal suspicions relating
to Markland (but see record in general (no indication that Spotten had criminal
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suspicions relating to Markland)), as already stated, the total facts and circumstances fail
to corroborate such suspicions for the level-two detention. (See supra, pages 10-12; see
also. Brief of Appellant.)
Indeed, the state acknowledges that the facts here support innocent conduct.
(State's Brief at 10 (recognizing that the reported cry may have been "due to some
innocent cause"), 10 (stating that carrying an over-the-shoulder bag may "appear wholly
innocent"), 11 (recognizing that defendant may have had any number of "innocent
explanations" for his presence in the area).) Nevertheless, the state urges this Court to
justify the deputies' conduct. It seems to claim that this Court may place a criminal gloss
on suggested facts and circumstances to support the reasonable-suspicion standard.
Specifically, the state asserts that people "are not usually found walking" home on
an isolated road at 3:14 a.m., "when home is nearly twenty blocks away." (State's Brief
at 9-10.) The state also maintains the "likelihood" of criminal activity in this case "given
the lateness of the hour." (State's Brief at 10). And it claims that while the facts may
appear innocent, Markland's "possession of two 'over-the-shoulder bags'" somehow
"added to the odds that [he] was involved in criminal activity." (Id.)
The state's argument here seems to supplant the demand for a case-by-case
assessment of the specific facts and circumstances for gross generalizations. That is
improper. The demand for specific facts to justify a particular intrusion by police "is the
central teaching of [the U. S. Supreme Court's] Fourth American Jurisprudence." Terry,
392 U.S. at 22, n.18. "Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally
13

guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result
this Court has consistently refused to sanction." Id at 22; State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d
761, 764 (Utah 1991) (ruling that unparticularized hunch will not support reasonable
suspicion for a detention). The state's sweeping generalizations do not comport with the
reasonable-suspicion standard.
Inasmuch as the state is unable to point to specific, articulable facts to justify the
detention and warrants check here, the detention and search cannot be upheld. (See
Brief of Appellant.) Markland respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial
court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
2. The State Does Not Dispute that Even if the Deputies Were Justified in
Detaining Markland When They First Encountered Him, the Deputies Lacked
Reasonable Suspicion to Continue and Expand the Detention for the Warrants
Check. Thus, the Extended Detention Was Unlawful. This Court Should Reverse
the Trial Court's Ruling on the Motion to Suppress on that Basis.
Next, the state claims that while the purported cries in this matter may be "due to
some innocent cause," a reasonable person may "infer" that unspecified crime was afoot.
(See State's Brief at 10.) Also, the state claims that the purported cries here were "more
than sufficient to justify a suspicion of criminal activity." (State's Brief, 11; see id. at 10.)
Markland's response to that argument is this: Assuming the state may be correct,
the deputies should have investigated the cries. Instead, they detained and investigated
Markland. The deputies did not have reasonable suspicion for that detention. (See
supra, subpoint B.I., herein; also Brief of Appellant, Argument A, & p. 14 n.2.)
In addition, assuming arguendo the investigation into the purported cries
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somehow related to Markland, once the deputies responded to the area and learned that
Markland had no information regarding the matter (see R. 78-79, Tffll-10), they were not
entitled to further detain him for continued questioning or to expand the investigation to
a warrants check absent reasonable suspicion that Markland was involved in "more
serious criminal activity." State v. Lopez 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994); State v.
Chapman. 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996); (Brief of Appellant at 20-25).
Since the deputies here failed to articulate more serious criminal activity, the extended detention was unconstitutional. Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453 (stating that no independent facts surrounding the encounter created suspicions that defendant was involved
in more serious criminal activity beyond that which justified the stop; thus, the officers
impermissibly expanded the scope of the detention when they ran a computer check).
The state does not dispute that the deputies here lacked reasonable suspicion to
continue/expand the detention. (See. State's Brief.) Nevertheless, the state seems to
claim that when the deputies observed Markland on the dead-end road and learned he
was walking home, they were justified to investigate the matter. (See id. at 9-11.) That
argument is misplaced. Without reasonable suspicion to support the continued detention,
the deputies' were not entitled to continue the detention to ask about Markland's plans.
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (specifying that officers must articulate more serious criminal
activity under reasonable-suspicion standard to continue detention for further questioning); (Brief of Appellant at 13-25). In that regard, the deputies' concerns about Markland's route home cannot serve to justify the expanded detention for the warrants check.
15

Next, the state asserts the deputies were entitled to run a warrants check "to assist
[them] in assessing the credibility of the defendant's explanation." (State's Brief at 12.)
Yet, an officer is not at liberty to use a level-two detention to assess the credibility of
each person the officer encounters. Such a notion undermines the purposes served by the
Fourth Amendment. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 30 (articulating reasonable-suspicion
standard to justify an intrusion under the Fourth Amendment).
Finally, assuming arguendo the deputies were justified in further detaining
Markland when they had concerns as to how he would get home from the dead-end road,
those concerns would not support expanding the detention to include a warrants check
for two reasons.
First, as stated in the opening brief, the deputies were required under the law to
resolve any concerns they had about the encounter quickly and in a manner that was
strictly tried to the circumstances. (Brief of Appellant at 20-25); see Terry, 392 U.S. at
18-19; Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132 (stating that the officers are required to "diligently
[pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly"); State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101,1J14, 470 Utah Adv. Rep. 63. That means
the deputies could have asked Markland how he intended to get home from the dead-end
road. See Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764. A satisfactory answer could have abated their
concerns about the matter. Id. (where officer had concerns about the car, the officer
could have asked defendant; instead the officer ran a warrants check, which was
unlawful). The deputies here failed to do that, rendering the excessive detention
16

unconstitutional. See id.; Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453.
The state disagrees. It claims the deputies were not required to ask because they
would not have been "bound to accept [Markland's answers] as truthful." (State's Brief
at 11.) That is unpersuasive. Common sense supports that a deputy is not entitled to
weigh the credibility of an answer if he refuses to ask the question.
Second, the record here fails to make any connection between the deputies'
concerns about Markland walking home, and a warrants check. Stated another way, a
warrants check would not have alleviated the deputies' concerns about how Markland
would get home from the dead-end road. In that regard, the warrants check exceeded the
scope of the justification for the stop and any additional concerns the deputies articulated
on this record under the totality of the circumstances. See Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764
In the end, even if the deputies initially were justified in detaining Markland in
this case, the deputies were not entitled to expand the investigation into a criminal
computer check. That was unlawful. See Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452-53. The subsequent search was unlawful as well. (See Brief of Appellant.) Markland respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the deputies did not claim that they suspected any criminal activity
either in the area or as it related to Markland. (R. I l l . ) In addition, the trial court failed
to properly apply the law. (R. 78-80.) The deputies' encounter with Markland constituted an unlawful detention. (See Brief of Appellant, Argument A.) The subsequent
17

search also was unlawful. (Id.) Markland respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress and remand the case for dismissal.
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